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Abstract
The paper presents estimations of the informal economy size in Bolivia from
an application of a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. The parameter esti-
mation is performed using maximum likelihood method to obtain, as an inter-
mediate result, a latent variable estimation of the informal economy size. This
procedure is new, as the estimate of the size of the informal economy using a
dynamic structural model represents an alternative study area to latent variable
models which assume relationships without a strong support in theory (MIMIC
models).
The results suggest that the size of the informal economy represents 60%
of Bolivian GDP in 2010 and that the trend has been decreasing in the last
decade. In addition, we simulated four alternative policies to reduce the size of
the underground economy. Some of them allow to identify surprising response
mechanisms which allows to analyze the ow of workers from the informal sector
into the formal sector and vice versa.
The research, besides quantifying the informal economy size, tries to provide
a tool and methodology for evaluating alternative policy scenarios related to
scal policy and labor mobility in a framework of an economy with a large
informal sector and evasion.
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1 Introduction
Measuring informal economy size has attracted considerable interest in recent decades1,
specially in developing countries 2. However, measuring size of informal sector in the
economy is not an easy task. One of the main challenges is the lack of a clear deni-
tion for informal economy. A wide range of similar terms are used in the literature, as
illegal, underground, unreported economy and so on. In addition, designation is just
the rst issue on informality. There are also large di¤erences in determining which
should be considered as informal sector activities, estimation processes and usage of
results for making economic analysis and taking public policy decissions. Because of
these di¢ culties and despite its importance "...we are still far from the time when
the results of studies of the underground economy can have immediate consequences
for policy or for the adjustment of various macroeconomic variables" (Tanzi, 1999).
This study seeks to promote new research in order to overcome these problems.
Growing informal activity around the world is an underlying concern (Schneider
and Enste, 2000), because -so far- it has not been possible to obtain a consensus about
how to measure it. Thus any attempt to measure informal economy is complicated,
mainly because activities that make up the informal economy seek to avoid o¢ cial
registration.
In this context, and given the large magnitude that informal economy size repre-
sents in Bolivia3 it is necessary to promote the economic study of this phenomenon
in order to suggest alternative economic policies. Following this objective, and focus-
ing on quantifying and proposing policy alternatives for the size of the underground
economy in Bolivia, this document is organized as follows: the second section reviews
the denitions and estimations methods of informal economy size identied in the
literature, third section briey describes behavior of informal economy in Bolivia,
section 4 details the strategy proposed to obtain an alternative measure of informal
economy. In section 5 the results related to three policy simulations are presented.
Finally, section 6 reviews the major ndings and conclusions.
1The literature about informal economy received an initial boost in Tanzi (1982).
2Schneider (2005) estimates suggest that the informal economy size in developing countries is
almost twice (as a proportion of GDP) compared to developed countries.
3According to Schneider (2005) the size of the informal sector in the Bolivian economy would
represent almost 70% of GDP. A parallel approach (Morales, 2008), considering the proportion of
workers in the informal sector as informality measure, found that 70% of workers are working in the
underground economy.
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2 Denition and Estimation Methods of Informal Econ-
omy Size
According to Feige (1996) underground economy includes the following types of ac-
tivities4:
 Illegal economy, which consists of the outcomes generated by economic activi-
ties that involve a violation of legal statutes that dene the scope of legitimate
forms of commerce.
 Undeclared economy, which consists in those legal and illegal economic activi-
ties that evade tax rules as stated in the tax laws.
 Informal economy, including economic activities that avoid costs and are ex-
cluded from benets and rights incorporated in the administrative laws and
rules that regulate the relations of property, commercial licensing, labor con-
tracts, liability, credit nancial and social systems.
Alternatively, Portes et al. (1989) dene informal economy as the income earn-
ing activities that are not regulated by institutions of society, in a legal and social
framework in which similar activities are regulated. This document, for measurement
purposes, will contain three alternative and not exclusive denitions:
 Informal economy size is the share of total output produced within productive
sector of unregistered economy.
 Unreported economy size is the proportion of existing evasion, dened as the
share of total output that represents the undeclared production of productive
registered enterprises.
 The employment size in informal sector is the share of all workers who decide to
work in underground sector of economy (enterprises not registered or o¢ cially
recognized).
The following subsections will give an overview of the state of art about existing
procedures for estimating informal economy size. These procedures can be catego-
rized into three types of methods5:
4An alternative denition of underground economy can be found in Cowell (1990). This document
will take informal economy as synonymous of informal underground economy.
5This classication and descriptions closely follow Klinglmair and Schneider (2004). For more
details you should refer to that document.
3
2.1 Direct Approaches
These are mainly composed by microeconomic approaches that use surveys based on
voluntary participation and data collection methods based on scal audits.
The main disadvantage of using surveys is that they present the common failures
of this type of processes: accuracy of ndings and results will depend on response and
veracity of participants. The main advantage of using surveys is that they provide
detailed information about informal economy structure, allowing to disaggregate the
information almost as much as required.
On the other hand, the size of the informal economy might be estimated as the
di¤erence between declared incomes for scal purposes and those measured by audits.
The problems facing this methodology is that the use of random audits is equivalent
to applying a biased sample of the population. The advantage is that objective data
are available (tax returns and nancial statements).
2.2 Indirect Approaches
The indirect methods try to estimate the informal economy size from the behavior of
variables that should reect the existence of underground activities. Next, we identify
ve variants of this type of calculation: i) discrepancies between the measurement
of expenditure and income; ii) discrepancies between o¢ cial and actual size of the
labor force, iii) approximation of transactions; iv) the cash demand approach, and v)
the physical input method (approximation of the production by means of electrical
consumption behavior).
2.3 Structural Approaches
All methods described so far are designed to estimate the size and development of
the informal economy based on a single indicator that would capture its e¤ects.
On the other hand, the structural estimates explicitly consider the use of mul-
tiple causes that lead to the existence and growth of informal economy, as well as
its multiple e¤ects. The empirical method used is based on the statistical theory
of unobserved variables, which considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of
the phenomenon to be measured. For estimation, it uses a factor-analytic approach
to measure the informal economy as an unobserved variable over time (latent vari-
able). The unknown coe¢ cients are estimated on a set of structural relationships
represented by equations in which the variable can not be measured directly6.
According to the literature, some causes of the underground economy, usually
included in MIMIC models, are: i) the burden of direct and indirect taxes both real
6This kind of models, Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes are known as MIMIC models
(for its acronym in English). An extension of these models which considers intertemporal e¤ects is
known as DYMIMIC model (Dynamic Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes model). Both are
special cases of SEM (Structural Equation Models).
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as perceived, ii) the burden of regulation as a proxy for other State activities, since
it is assumed that an increase in the burden of regulation creates a strong incentive
to enter the informal economy (Loayza et al., 2005), and iii) the tax morale as
the attitudes of citizens towards the State that describes layout of the people to
leave their o¢ cial occupations and enter informal economy (Torgler and Schneider,
2009; Frey and Torgler, 2007; Güth and Sausgruber, 2004). Among the indicators or
e¤ects of the underground economy, researchers typically include: i) the performance
of monetary indicators: if activities in the informal economy increases, it requires
a further increase in monetary transactions, ii) labor market development, as an
increase in the share of workers in the informal sector implies a decrease in their
participation in the formal economy, and iii) the production market performance: an
increase in the informal economy means that inputs (specially labor) will move from
the o¢ cial economy (at least in part), causing a shift that could have a depressive
e¤ect on the o¢ cial growth rate of the economy.
The estimation method we propose and which is detailed in Section 4, is a logical
extension of structural models that seeks to add a theoretical background to estimate
the size of the informal economy as a latent variable. But previously, the following
section contextualizes the behavior of the informal economy in Bolivia, based on
information from previous studies.
3 The Informal Economy in Bolivia
The size of the informal economy in Bolivia has been estimated by di¤erent tech-
niques, by di¤erent authors, and under di¤erent denitions of informality. There are
three commonly applied empirical denitions: one that denes the informal economy
as the proportion of all workers who carry out their activities without complying with
employment records and existing legal obligations; as the proportion of the o¢ cial
product, which is generated by informal activities, and; as the proportion of tax eva-
sion. Table 1 summarizes the results of some estimations, where the common factor
is that the informal economy size in Bolivia is not an isolated element, but rather
represents a signicant proportion of economic activity, both in the proportion of
workers involved, and the proportion of output generated. In general, most estima-
tions suggest that the informal economy size would be in a range between 60% and
70%, measured as both, the share of total workers, and the share of o¢ cial output.
See Table 1.
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Country Author Methodology Years Results
31 Latin
America and
the Caribbean
countries.
Loayza A.
Norman
(1997)
Approximation of informal sector
participation on the basis of a
statistical model that considers the
relative size of informal sector (the ratio
between the level of informal sector
production and total GDP) as a variable
"latent" that potentially has multiple
causes and so that can be explained by
multiple factors.
Data base
used 1980-
1992
Estimations are considered
valid to quantify the informal
economy in the early 90's.
The results showed that
Bolivia is the country that has
a greater degree of informality
and the contribution to the
economy is 65.6% of GDP.
Bolivia Humerez
Quiroz
Julio (2005)
The methodology used is the cash
demand, that is to make inferences
from the information contained in
monetary aggregates, on the
assumption that agents use cash in
order to make informal activities.
1994-2003 The size of the shadow
economy (informal sector) is
estimated in average 47%.
21 Latin
America and
the Caribbean
countries.
Gasparini
and
Tornatolli
(2007)
The authors use two definitions of
informality: the legalistic and
productivity to define the size of the
informal economy through household
surveys.
1989-2005
(Between
1993 and
2002 for
Bolivia)
Results suggest a informal
economy size in Bolivia of
77%.
Bolivia Landa and
Yañez
(2007)
Proportion of workers in the informal
sector information. Based on surveys of
households, which are representative
at the urban level.
1996-2006 The informal economy would
be about 60% with decreasing
trend.
Bolivia Morales
(2008)
Informal Sector definition according to
ILO.
1999-2005 The informal economy size (in
proportion of workers) would
be about 70% with decreasing
trend.
Bolivia Mártinez
and
Chumacero
(2009)
The methodology used considers those
occupational categories in survey and
are assumed to jobs of low productivity
due to be labor intensive and not
capital intesive.
1995, 2000
and 2005.
The degree of informality that
was found was 65.3% in
1995, a percentage that
dropped to 62.4% in 2000
and 2005. It means that
almost two thirds of those
employed in urban areas are
informal, with a low
productivity employment and
low income taking them close
to poverty.
120 Countries Schneider
and Buehn
(2007)
Calculations based on the combination
of a MIMIC process (latent variable
method for multiple indicators and
multiple causes)
1996-2006 The size of the informal
economy as a proportion of
GDP, would be about 67.3%
in average for the period of
analysis
Table 1. Informal Economy Size in Bolivia.
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Figure 1 compares the size of the informal economy in Bolivia with averages from
other world regions. One element that makes the analysis of informality in Bolivian
economy interesting is its magnitude. According to Schneider and Buehn (2007)
estimates for the 1999-2006 period, 67.3% of Bolivias GDP would be generated
by informal activities, which means that among 120 countries, Bolivia occupies the
second place (only behind Georgia) among countries with larger informal economies.
According to these data, the informal economy, measured as a share of o¢ cial GDP,
has a slight upward trend in Bolivia in the recent years.
Figure 1. Estimated size of Economy in Bolivia and
other groups of countries. (Source: Schneider and
Buehn, 2007)
An alternative denition of informality based on employment (Landa and Yañez,
2007) show three approaches to the proportion of workers who perform their work in
underground sector of the economy. The rst identies the informal workers as those
who do not receive social protection (legal denition), the second measures by the
size of the companies (where rms with less than 5 workers are considered informal),
and the third bases on company registration in the national tax records. Figure 2
summarizes these results, and suggest that the informal economy size, under any
of the three employment measurement denitions, is relevant, although it shows a
slight decrease in the 1996-2006 period of study. In any case, it is necessary to clarify
that the data of Landa and Yañez (2007) only represent the behavior of the urban
area, suggesting that the size of the underground economy at national level might be
higher, considering that rural sector activities are typically performed without any
o¢ cial registration.
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Figure 2. Estimated Size of the Urban Informal
Economy in Bolivia (Source: Landa and Yañez,
2007)
The results of the estimations compiled in this section coincide that the size of the
informal economy is non-negligible. Furthermore, a common factor in the mentioned
researches, is that they primarily focus on estimating or characterizing the informal
economy size; the estimation method we propose in next section, has the virtue that,
in addition to providing a new series of the size of the informal economy, seeks to
promote the study of the underlying mechanisms from a structural scope.
4 The Estimation Method
As mentioned above, the method we propose to quantify the size of the informal
economy is a natural extension of DYMIMIC models. The main di¤erence resides
in the equations included in the model, which are derived from the linearization
of a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. This means that relations are based on
optimizer behavior of model agents. In this sense, we present a model that can
be understood as an extension of the dynamic general equilibrium models of Chen
(2003) and Busato et al. (2006). To the best of our knowledge, this type of model
has not been used to quantify the informal economy size by applying the Kalman
lter to estimate a latent variable. However, there are some approaches in that
direction: Karanl and Ozkaya (2007) used the Kalman lter to estimate the size
of the unrecorded economy in Turkey, using records of energy consumption as an
indicator of it. The di¤erence with our approach is that, while based on a structural
model, this model does not come explicitly from optimizing behavior of agents. On
the other hand, Arango et al. (2006) also apply the Kalman lter to measure the size
of the underground economy in Colombia between 1976-2003, and presents a critique
of DYMIMIC and MIMIC models. Their estimates are based on the estimation of
a cash demand function, combined with a linear approximation of the implications
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of the structural model Loayza (1997). This approach is methodologically similar to
the one we propose; however, it arises from a non-unied structural model.
Within the model we propose it is possible to consider the size of the informal
economy for at least three denitions or components: i) the proportion of unreported
income by o¢ cially registered businesses (evasion), ii) the proportion of output that
is generated by companies that are not registered by the government, and iii) the
proportion of workers who choose to work in the informal sector.
The model is composed by three actors: government, households and rms7.
It includes various events that promote and - under some conditions - ensure the
co-existence of an informal sector with the formal sector. Thus, agents are able to
evade taxes, meaning evasion for underreporting of income, but can also avoid the full
payment of such taxes by producing from the informal sector. The two possibilities
are not mutually exclusive, in fact the model allows both: i) a rm which chooses to
produce some share in the informal sector, and ii) evade taxes related with its formal
sector production.
Firms face the likelihood to be detected by the government, both in the case
of tax evasion as in the case of producing in the informal sector. In the case of
detection, they face nes (penalties) that apply on the amount of the omitted tax.
Probabilities and nes may be the same or di¤erent for the two types of infringement.
Besides, we include a mechanism where detection probabilities are endogenous, and
depend on a regulatory quality indicator of the activities of government, holding the
line of ndings of Loayza et al. (2005). Endogeneity is supported because regulatory
quality is a¤ected by a proportion of government spending used to improve it.
The model depends on a set of parameters that need to be dened so that it is a
good representation of the Bolivian economy. There is much literature regarding the
better strategy to dene these parameters, which highlights an important distinction
between calibration and estimation processes (Cooley 1997, Hansen and Heckman
1996; Gomme and Rupert 2005; and Dejong and Dave 2007). In this paper we choose
the parameter estimation by the method of maximum likelihood.
The maximum likelihood estimation is based on the resolution of the model -
by a rst order approximation - according to the perturbation method proposed in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). Once the model solution is found, it can be ex-
pressed as a set of di¤erence equations. Then the system of di¤erence equations is
assigned to a vector of observable variables known as measurement equations. The
measurement equations system is then used in the Kalman lter to construct like-
lihood functions under the assumption of normality of error terms. An important
intermediate output of the Kalman lter is observed and unobserved smoothed vari-
ables generated in the estimation process, which are, in the case of unobserved vari-
ables, latent variable estimations8, including the variable that identies the informal
7Model details are in Apendix A.
8This exercise is analogous to that performed in DeJong et al. (2000).
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economy size9. The application of the proposed method, whose results are described
in the next section, was performed using Dynare v.4.2.1 (a Matlab Toolbox).
5 Results
In the following we describe the main ndings and policy exercises supported by the
method of the preceding section. As mentioned above, the rst step is to estimate
the model parameters so that it could be considered a good approximation of the
Bolivian economy. The model includes 32 parameters to determine, since this large
number of parameters leads to di¢ culties for joint estimation, we used a block esti-
mation strategy, in such a way to nd areas where the log-likelihood function is well
behaved. We included ve observable variables on the estimation process: the o¢ cial
GDP, government spending, investment, consumption, and the index of regulatory
quality. The former four were obtained from national accounts in Bolivia, while the
latter corresponds to the Governance Matters project (World Bank). The estimated
parameters are summarized in Table 2.
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
A 0.98 s 1.27 ! 0.1
B 1.12 t 1.4 q -0.24
 0.36 T1 -17 1 0.99
 0.07 T2 45 2 0.99
F 0.24 T3 -5.1 q 0.99
L 0.16 T4 1 e1 0.04
 2.28 W1 0.01 e2 0.03
 2 W2 1 e3 0.39
h 0.7 ' 0.29 e4 0.03
 0.99  0.83 e5 0.02
 0.57 H 2
Table 2. Estimated Parameters for the model
It is important to notice that a subset of variables (;H) were not estimated,
but taken from the literature and/or xed to reasonable values because it was not
possible to build a well-behaved likelihood function for them. In general, the other
estimated parameters are within the ranges suggested by the theory and highlight
elements that deserve further analysis: the underground sector technology would
be higher than the o¢ cial sector (B > A); the penalty for evading in the formal
sector is lower than the penalty for being found producing in the underground sector
9Further details about method of solution can be found in Dejong and Dave (2007), Canova
(2007), and Adjemian et al. (2011)
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(s < t); the probability of being detected evading in the formal sector is highly
sensitive to regulatory quality, while the probability of detection when producing in
the underground sector, is not so sensitive to regulatory quality (T2 > W2); the share
of government spending representing a positive externality for the formal sector is
higher than the share which represents a positive externality for the underground
sector ( > '). Except for the rst one, these results are intuitive according to the
evidence and current tax laws.
The parameters in Table 2 are consistent with the following values of the variables
in steady-state:
Variable Steady-State Value
y 1
c=y 0.46
g=y 0.28
i=y 0.25
yO=y 0.34
yU=y 0.66
 0.33
 0.75
p 0.48
o 0.61
q 0.46
Table 3. Steady-State of the Model
Above results are quite consistent with other authorsestimations described in
the previous section. At steady-state, the informal economy size represent 66% of the
o¢ cial product (yU=y), about 67% of workers who belong or have activities in the
informal sector (1   ); the o¢ cially registered companies would declare only 75%
of their income () which implies a 25% output tax evasion (1   ); and regulatory
quality would be around the average of the countries in the sample (q = 0:46).
Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous section, it is possible to have an estimation
of informal economy time evolution. This estimation shows a decreasing behavior of
the informal economy size which, as theory suggests, is accompanied by an increase
in the size of the formal economy (see Figure 3 and Table 4).
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Figure 3. Estimated Size of the Informal Economy in Bolivia
Year yU=y
1996 66:0
1997 66:3
1998 67:3
1999 64:9
2000 64:3
2001 62:0
2002 62:2
2003 61:0
2004 61:5
2005 61:1
2006 61:1
2007 60:4
2008 60:4
2009 60:2
2010 59:6
Table 4. Size of the Informal Economy
Previous calculation of the informal economy size follows the same procedure as
in Loayza (1997). To transform a time series from a latent variable (with relative
scale) to a time series with absolute scale we must x two points: the rst is the
estimation of informal employment of Landa and Yañez (2007) for 1996, and the
second - to adjust the distance between ranks - is the data of informality for 2006
from the same source. Since Landa and Yañez (2007) use an employment approach
to measure the size of informal economy, we performed a scale adjustment in order
to get a measure of informality as the share of GDP.
According to model estimations, the main reason for the decreasing trend of
informal economy should be attributed to positive technology shocks in formal sector,
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which is reinforced by negative shocks in technology in the underground economy10,
and a decline in regulatory quality. The mechanism under which a reduction in
regulatory quality can increase the size of the o¢ cial sector, according to the model, is
as follows: a diminution in the regulatory quality decreases the detection probability
of evasion, so that agents nd out that tax burden within the o¢ cial sector is lower,
and therefore reduce their incentives to move to underground economy.
In the following subsection we introduce four alternative scenarios of economic
policy experiments; they aim to reduce the informal economy size, without increasing
formal sector productivity.
5.1 Four Scenarios for Policy Making
We raise four alternative strategies that an economic policy maker might propose to
reduce the informal economy size, namely: i) increase the penalties to evade capture
in the formal sector, ii) increase the penalties to be caught working in the under-
ground sector, iii) increase government regulatory quality (or reduce corruption),
and iv) policies ii) and iii), jointly.
Table 5 summarizes the main ndings:
Variable Baseline Scenario Scenarios of Policy
i) +s ii) +t iii) +q iv) +t ^+q
yU=y 0:66 +   +  
yO=y 0:34   +   +
1   0:24    +    
 0:33   +   +
Table 5. E¤ects of four alternative policies on the size of the informal economy
With regard to the rst policy option, it seems surprising that increasing the
penalty to formal sector workers who evade, decreases the size of the formal sector
boosting the agents to work in the informal sector. The transmission mechanism is
as follows: evasion becomes more expensive due to increased penalties, so the agents
must face a higher tax burden (evading less), but higher tax burden boost to leave
the formal sector and move to underground sector.
On the other hand It seems clear that, from the point of view of e¤ectiveness,
increasing penalties to agents working in the informal sector (second policy alterna-
tive) might be a better choice. Thus, the second policy scenario in Table 5, which
suggests increasing the penalty in the underground sector, appears to reach desirable
results in order to reduce the size of the informal economy. In fact, the increment in
t increases expected costs of producing in the underground sector, so the option to
operate in the formal sector marginally becomes more attractive.
10Productivity shocks were analyzed through the smoothed series generated by the Kalman lter.
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The third policy experiment, focused on increasing regulatory quality provided
by government (variable highly correlated with control of corruption and government
e¤ectiveness index11) presents similar results to those of the rst experiment. The
increase in regulatory quality, per se, is not an e¤ective policy, since it leads to
increase capture probability in the formal sector (more than in the informal sector),
this implies that it becomes more costly to evade (in fact the policy reduces the levels
of evasion 1  ), so agents move to the informal sector because they face a heavier
tax burden in the formal sector.
Finally, we simulate a combined policy, under which the increase in regulatory
quality can be combined with an increase in the penalties imposed when an agents
are caught producing in the informal sector. This fourth scenario, is highly e¤ective
in reducing the informal economy size ( (yU=y)), displacing workers and capital
into the formal sector (+) and decreasing the evasion levels ( (1  )).
The sensitivity of the main variables to the rst three policy proposals outlined
can be inferred from the following graphs12.
Figure 4. Changes in the penalties for evasion in the formal sector
Figure 4 corroborates results of case i) (Table 5). That is to say, an increase
in penalties for evading implies, at rst glance counterintuitively, an increase in the
informal sector of the economy. When increasing the size of the penalties in the
formal sector, from 1:27 (27% of e¤ective ne) to about 2 (100% e¤ective penalty),
the size of the formal sector (yO) and the proportion of its workers ("mu"or ) are
reduced by almost 20%, the informal sector expands in 8% and the proportion of
income reported by companies to the Tax Agency ("xi"or ) are increased by 15%,
therefore decreasing evasion (1  ) in the same amount.
11The correlation between regulatory quality and government e¤ectiveness is 0.93 (using World
Bank Governance Matters series).
12 In Figures 4, 5 and 6, the vertical axis is adjusted so that the value of 1 corresponds to steady-
state value in Table 3.
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Figure 5. Changes in the penalties for producing in informal sector.
The sensitivity analysis of the second policy (case ii) in Table 3) is shown in
Figure 5. The estimated value of e¤ective penalties in the baseline scenario is t = 1:4
(i.e. 40% of nes over unrecorded production value). If, as in the previous case, the
penalty increases to reach 100% of nes, that is to say t = 2, the model suggests
that the size of the formal economy, and the proportion of workers in the formal
sector would increase just over 120%, the size of the informal economy (yU ) would
be reduced by 70%, and evasion (1 ) would be reduced to a certain threshold, after
that it begins to increase again. This nonlinear behavior deserves some explanation:
increasing penalties to informal sector producers decreases informal sector produc-
tion and increases formal sector production; at some stage formal sector production
could not compensate the decline in the informal sector production, so the revenues
from the formal sector could not compensate the fall in revenues from the informal
sector, creating a kind of La¤er curve on government revenues, this nonlinearity is
transmitted to regulatory quality levels which depend on the level of government
revenues, and nally, the probabilities of being caught in both sectors depend on the
levels of regulatory quality, and evasion levels depends on the probability of detec-
tion. Thus, the initial increase and subsequent decline of total output, generate an
initial reduction of evasion followed by an increase of it, nevertheless this behavior is
marginal in its magnitude. Also, this result suggest that increasing indiscriminately
the penalties in the underground sector does not necessarily result in a maximizing
production policy.
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Figure 6. Changes in regulatory quality
Finally, Figure 6 shows the sensitivity analysis of a policy aimed at increasing
regulatory quality. To simulate this policy, we assume a positive shock on the au-
tonomous regulatory quality level (variable
 
q in equation A.12 in Annex A). The
increase in
 
q would be reected in an increase in regulatory quality index q, whose
value is represented in the horizontal axis of Figure 6 charts. Thus an increase in
regulatory quality does not necessarily imply a smaller size of the informal economy,
in fact, the increase in regulatory quality implies an increase of the informal econ-
omy size and a decrease in the size of the formal economy. This happens because
the increase in q promotes better control (i.e. increase in probability of detection) in
both the formal sector through the detection probability p as in the informal sector
through o. Furthermore, the results of the estimation of the model imply that the
probability of detection within the formal sector is much more sensitive to regulatory
quality that the probability of detection within the informal sector. Therefore, the
increase in regulatory quality discourages evasion more than the disincentive to pro-
duce in the informal economy. Finally, the decline of evasion increases the e¤ective
tax and therefore the tax burden in the formal sector, leading to a transfer of formal
sector workers into the informal sector.
To conclude this section it is important to review the results in column iv) of
Table 3. In the fourth policy option we propose to increase penalties for informal
sector and improve regulatory quality, both at the same time. This policy mix would
allow: to promote formal sector size, decreasing the levels of evasion as well, and
decrease the size of the informal sector by increasing the relative cost of staying in
it. Obviously, this is not the only possible combination, and a thorough analysis of
public policy should consider other factors besides the mentioned here.
The aim of the performed exercises is to establish that a policy which tries to
reduce informal economy might not necessarily be made considering isolated elements
of the evidence, and instead it should take into account indirect e¤ects that often
can be counterintuitive. In this context, it is important to emphasize that one of
advantages of this type of methodology and estimations of the size of the underground
economy, is that it can be extensible for considering the e¤ects of di¤erent policies
on other desirable objectives such as welfare, economic growth or revenues, to name
a few.
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper aims to quantify the informal economy size in Bolivia and propose pol-
icy alternatives based on the results of a dynamic general equilibrium model. The
method used to calculated the size of the informal economy is novel because allows
to take advantage of the parameter estimations by maximum likelihood to calcu-
late a latent variable (unobserved) which represents the proportion of output that is
generated in the informal sector of the economy.
The model presented in the paper allows to quantify the size of the informal
economy in Bolivia from di¤erent denitions: as the total output share; as the exist-
ing tax evasion in the formal (registered) sector, and; as the proportion of employees
working in the informal (unregistered) sector. The results suggest that the size of the
informal economy in Bolivia - measured as the share of total output of the economy -
declined in recent years, which would potentially mean 60% of the total economy in
2010. This decreasing trend follows closely the results of Morales (2008), and Landa
and Yañez (2007).
Furthermore, we proposed four policy simulation exercises aimed to reduce the
size of the informal economy in Bolivia: i) increasing penalties for tax evaders in the
formal sector of the economy ii) increasing the penalties for agents who are producing
in the informal sector of economy, iii) increasing government regulatory quality, and
iv) combining policies ii) and iii). According to the estimated model parameters,
results indicate that not all these policies are desirable and in some cases the results
are counterintuitive and would imply increasing the size of the informal economy.
In fact, an increase of penalties in the formal sector of economy, and an increase of
regulatory quality levels imply an increase in the size of the underground economy.
On the other hand, we nd that a combined policy, where the penalties for those who
produce in the informal economy are increased, and regulatory quality is improved,
could have desirable e¤ects when trying to reducethe size of the informal sector, and
evasion levels.
However, it is necessary to make the analysis of these policies within alternative
denitions of what desirable means, understanding that there might be superior
objectives besides those considered in this paper proposal, for instance: increasing
well-being, increasing consumption, reducing tax revenues volatility, increasing the
share of workers in the formal sector, etc. In this sense, we believe that the proposed
methodology is a useful and extensible tool to lead public policy debate related to
the size of the underground economy from di¤erent goals and an integral approach
to the problem.
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A Model
The model is a slightly modied version of Vargas (2009), which considers a repre-
sentative agent model, both for consumption as for production in which taxes are
applied on labor and output. The production technology has two sectors:
 A legal, formal or registered sector in which it is possible to declare - for scal
purposes - income levels lower than the real. In this sector there might be tax
evasion.
 An unregistered sector, which evades all taxes on labor and product factor.
This sector uses a proportion of all capital and labor available for the rm.
Logically, the specication includes the government sector, which provides public
goods and services and determines (in this case exogenously) taxes on labor and
production factor. Another important feature of the model is that it includes the
e¤ect of regulatory quality / control of corruption on the decision of the agents, by
integrating them through endogenous coe¢ cients of detection probability that rms
and workers perceive. Regard to consumers, they face a utility function that depends
on consumption and leisure.
In the remainder of this section we show model conditions.
A.1 The rms problem
We assume the following specications to represent the technology of rms in both
sectors, o¢ cial and underground13:
yO  yO  A; kO; lO; g and yU  yU  A; kU ; lU ; g (A.1)
The above equations consider a positive externality in the production functions
of the o¢ cial and underground sector, they are generated by government spending
as in Barro (1992). Constant returns to scale in the three productive factors are
assumed, that is capital, labor and government spending. It is assumed that pro-
duction functions have positive and decreasing returns in each factor separately, and
also fulll the Inada conditions.
The rms income for product sales are equal to y = yO+ yU (normalizing prices
to 1); however, taxes must be deducted and/or penalties to which the rm is subject
plus costs for the retributions to productive factors. In this way we calculate prot
of the rm.
The government charges a tax on formal output yO according to a percentage
aliquot F . Since the government ignores the actual output of rms, it is possible
13The above indices O and U represent the o¢ cial (formal) and underground (informal) sector,
respectively.
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that they declare only a proportion  from its total output, where 0 <  < 1. The
government nds, with a probability p; rms declared  < 1, and applies in this case
a proportional penalty on the tax evaded as well (with s > 1).
The rms income also comes from its underground operations yU . We assume
that the company - in underground sector - faces a probability of detection (o) and
penalties (t), di¤erent from those within the formal sector. In addition, rm decides
the share of labor that goes to the o¢ cial sector and implicitly the share of labor it
is assigned to the underground sector. Given these elements, the benet function of
rms is:
 = (1  E) yO + (1  o  t  F ) yU   w  l   (r + )  k (A.2)
where E  F (+p s(1 )) and  k = kO; (1 ) k = kU ;  l = lO; (1 ) l =
lU ; kO + kU = k y lO + lU = l .
Under the assumption of competitive markets, a rm takes the wage w, r capital
income and job level l as given, and maximizes its prot by equating the marginal
productivity of capital to its rent. That is:
r = yOk (1  E) + yUk (1  o  t  F )   (A.3)
Given that the assumption of competitive markets should ensure the zero prot
condition. The salary must equal the marginal product of labor to capital level of
equation (A.3). That is:
w =
(1  E)
 
y0   k  yOk

+ (1  o  t  F )
 
yU   k  yUk

l
(A.4)
Where yjk represents the marginal productivity of capital in sector j. In addition,
rms choose to declare a proportion of their income  from the condition:
@
@
= 0 (A.5)
Finally, rms determine the proportion of labor and capital will use with each
production technology. This means that the parameters  and  are determined
endogenously. For this, the rm solves the following conditions:
@
@
= 0
@
@
= 0 (A.6)
In particular, the following functional forms are dened for production functions:
yO = A (k) (l) (g)1   (A.7)
yU =M ((1  )  k) ((1  )  l) ('g)1   (A.8)
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Furthermore, we must take into account the following constraints:0 <  < 1; 0 <
 < 1; 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1;  +  < 1; or < ; ' < 1 and  < '. The last
inequality reects the intensity of the positive externality of government spending on
the production function is lower in the underground sector than in the formal sector.
Finally, the relevant probabilities of capturing to the rm p and o can be con-
sidered in terms of regulatory quality q. These assumptions are consistent with the
empirical evidence that suggests that the detection probability and statutory penal-
ties are not signicant to explain the size of the informal economy.
p =
1
1 + e (T1+T2q+T3+T4F )
(A.9)
o =
1
1 + e (W1+W2q)
(A.10)
In addition, the regulatory quality index is bounded in the interval (0;1), where
higher values represent better regulatory quality. Besides, regulatory quality would
positively depend on a proportion ! of government spending g. The last couple of
features are reected in the following specications14:
qt =
1
1 + e (eqt) (A.11)
eqt = qt +H (!  gt) (A.12)
The variable
 
q t can be understood as an autonomous level of regulatory quality,
and encompass all the elements of regulatory quality which are not directly a¤ected
by government spending. It can be understood that this variable is associated with
cultural elements such as morality or tax consciousness and acceptance of corruption,
for example. Empirically, we consider it as a standardized variable.
A.2 The Problem of households, workers and investors.
Consumers seek to maximize their expect utility (U) which in this case depends on
consumption (c) and the valuation of leisure (1   l) discounted by a factor  to an
innite period of time:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tU (ct; lt) (A.13)
Households use the income (after taxes) they do not consume to accumulate
assets (a), according to the following rule of accumulation that takes into account a
tax aliquot L proportional to the wage.
14The relative weight of the e¤ect of level of self-regulatory quality and government spending on
regulatory quality is reected in the parameter H
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at+1   at = (1  L)wttlt + (1  o  t  L)wt (1  t) lt + rt  at   ct (A.14)
Households seek to maximize their utility derived from discounted ow of con-
sumption and labor. According to Bellman Optimality Principle (1957), the problem
can be expressed as:
V (at) = max fU (ct; lt) +   E [V (at+1)]g (A.15)
Solving the problem we can nd the rst order conditions that maximize the
utility from the choice of optimal consumption and employment. These conditions
are presented in equations (A.16) and (A.17):
1 = Et


Uc;t+1
Uc;t
(1 + rt+1)

(A.16)
1 = Et

Ul;t
Uc;t (1  L)wt  t + (1  o  t  L)wt (1  t)

(A.17)
Since families are the owners of assets, it is possible to even at = kt in (A.14),
then, including relations in equations (A.3) and (A.4) and the identity yt = yOt + y
U
t
we can reach the following expression, which is simply the resource constraint of the
economy:
kt+1   kt = yt   gt   kt     ct (A.18)
In particular, we dene a utility function with a coe¢ cient  of constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) separable in consumption and leisure (1  l):
U (ct; lt) =
c1 t   1
1   + h
(1  lt)1 
1   (A.19)
Where h  0 and 1= represents the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of
leisure.
A.3 Government Restriction.
The government collects taxes based on output and labor. Furthermore, there are
revenues related to the penalties charged when tax evaders or informal producers are
caught.
From the behavior of rms is straightforward to dene the revenue from activities
within the formal sector as:
RO = Y O  F ( + p  s  (1  )) + w  L    L (A.20)
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Using the identity E  F ( + p  s(1  )) we can express (A.20) as:
RO = Y O  E + w  L    L (A.21)
While, when the informal sector is discovered the revenue generated equals to:
RU = o  t  Y U  F + o  t  L  (1  )  w  L (A.22)
With these denitions we can specify a combined budget constraint of the gov-
ernment as follows:
Y OE + w  L    L + Y U  o  t  F + o  t  L  (1  )  w  L (A.23)
max (; ') G+ ! G+ (1 max (; ')  !)G = G = RO +RU (A.24)
The left side of the last restriction represents that government spending might
be distributed between: i) goods that are useful in the production of goods, ii) in
resources that improves quality regulatory and revenue, and iii) government expenses
that not belong to the group i) or ii), this last one term considers public spending
which does not generate benets for society. When simulations are performed we
assume that (1   max(; ')   !) > 0 that means there is no a binding constraint
between allocating resources that benet the productive sector and allocate resources
which benet the level of regulatory quality.
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B Related Studies
The following table is a summary of studies measuring the informal economy using
di¤erent methodologies, applied to di¤erent countries and di¤erent periods of time.
Country Author Methodology Años Results
Africa, Asia, LA,
Central Europe
countries, ex
URSS and OECD
members
Schneider and Enste
(2000)
Calculations based on physical
inputs, cash demand and
modeling approaches.
Averaga from
1990 to 1993
Measuring informal economy in
developing, transition and developed
countries.
Portugal  Dell’Anno, Roberto
(2006)
Multiple Indicators and Multiple
Causes Model  (MIMIC)
 1977 - 2004 Measuring Portugal informal
economy and policy
recommendations to adopt.
Canadá  Tedds, Lindsay
(2005)
Multiple Indicators and Multiple
Causes Model  (MIMIC)
 1976 - 2001 MIMIC model application to
measure the informal economy in
Canada over time.
Perú  Hernández, Manuel
and De la Roca, Jorge
(2006)
Discrepancies in level of
consumption among groups -
from underreporting.
2000 Right and proper measurement of
informal economy and the share of
informal PEA in Peru.
Ex URSS, Central
and Eastern
Europe
 Schneider, Friedrich
(2002)
Cash Demand and Model MIMIC
approach.
 1998 - 1999
and 2001 -
2002
Factors that cause an increase in the
informal economy.
Italia  Dell’Anno, Roberto
(2003)
Approach using structural
equations and MIMIC model.
 1962 - 2000 Utilization of two methodologies to
measure informal economy in Italy.
Compare and contrast.
145 countries  Schneider, Friedrich Direct, indirect and Modelistic
methods - depending on the
characteristics of each country.
 1999 - 2003 The increase in tax rates and social
security contributions, combined
with the growing labor market
regulations, boost growth of the
underground economy.
LA and the
Caribbean
countries
 Vuletin, Guillermo
(2008)
Utilization of Modelistic
approach.
Early 2000 Taxes system Strengthening and
regulation, along with high inflation
and a predominance of agriculture in
production, are key factors in
measuring informal economy size.
 México  Brambila Macias, Jose
(2008)
Error Correction Model  1970 - 2006 It is found a positive correlation
bewteen informal sector and
economic growth in the long-run.
 Brasil  Reza Arabsheibani, G
and Carneiro,
Francisco (2006)
Three approaches are used:
employment contract registers,
social security registers and
employee caracterization in
Brasil using survey households.
 1992 - 2001  The conditional impact of particular
factors changes according to the
methodology used to measure
informality. For this reason,
definitions of informality based on
occupation and employment size
seem to be the most arbitrary
measures but conceptually
substantiated.
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